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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 

RULE OF LAW 

RAOUL BERGER* 
In his article, The Specious Morality of the Law,l Professor 
Sanford Levinson2 brands various calls for maintenance of the rule 
of law under the Constitution a "ritualistic incantation" and de­
plores the divorce of law from moral norms. 3 He maintains that a 
law that is merely identified with majority "will" is not, in terms 
of moral integrity, worthy of respect, because the majority "no­
tion of justice" may be "perceived as manifest tyranny by someone 
else." Why should "those who feel tyrannized by the existing legal 
order . . . recognize it as legitimate?"4 Add his emphasis that 
"[l]iberty has come to focus on freedom from the community or the 
State,"5 and Levinson verges on an invitation to disregard for law, 
at a time, as even he acknowledges, when except "reverence for 
law . . . there is no other basis for uniting a nation of so many 
disparate groupS."6 His counsel to resist "the call for new faith in 
an old gospel"7 requires more solid footing than he has furnished. 
• Raoul Berger, a well-known constitutional scholar, is the author ofIMPEACH­
MENT, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, and numerous legal arti­
cles. From 1971 to 1976, he was Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal 
History at Harvard Law School. In May, 1978, the University of Michigan awarded 
him an honorary doctorate. 
1. S. Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S, May, 1977, at 35. 
2. Professor Levinson is a lawyer and teaches in the department of politics at 
Princeton University. 
3. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
4. [d. at 38, 40. 
5. [d. at 36. 
6. [d. at 41. 
7. [d. at 35. 
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I 
Levinson begins by dismissing Barbara Jordan's "total" com­
mitment to the Constitution in the course of the House Judiciary 
Hearings on the impeachment of President Nixon as incomprehen­
sible because "presumably" she would not have thought the origi­
nal Constitution which "protected slavery . . . worthy of venera­
tion."8 One may as well reject the great cultural achievements of 
the Greeks because the Athenians were slaveholders, and a slave 
was heartlessly defined by Aristotle as "a tool with life in it."9 Each 
society must be judged by standards of its own time and historical 
context. To transport Barbara Jordan back 200 years in time-when 
a nation aborning compromised with slaveholding states the better 
to face a hostile world-is not nearly so fruitful as to view the 
world in which she lives, where in the Africa where she has her 
roots Idi Amin slaughters thousands of fellow blacks in Uganda and 
is regarded admiringly by many Africans. Well might she prefer to 
live. under a constitution that secures her against such horrors, 
even though it falls short of perfection. 
Philosophers, William James said, devote themselves to study 
'of those residual questions on which people are unable to agree, 
among them the nature of "law. "10 The thin air of philosophy is 
not for an earthbound lawyer, so I shall attempt in more mundane 
fashion first to examine what the Constitutio~ and the rule of law 
meant to the Founders, and why that meaning remains vitally im­
portant for us today. 
. After a long and bitter struggle, the Founders had succeeded 
in throwing off the shackles of an "omnipotent parliament" and 
hereditary monarch. ll Now they proclaimed that the people were 
sovereign and that all power was delegated by them to their "ser­
vants and agents." Schooled in the insatiable greed for power of 
those given to rule, the Founders grudgingly enumerated the 
granted powers and repeatedly stressed that those grants were 
"limited. "12 Their fear of arbitrary power led them to insist on 
standing laws, not, as the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution em­
phasized, laws passed after the fact which retroactively made a 
8. [d. at 35, 36. 
9. 1 C. BRINTON, J. CHRISTOPHER, & R. WOLFF, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 
67 (1960). 
10. Singer, A Discipline Examining Nature's Ultimate Reality, N.Y. Times, 
May 8, 1977, § 4 (Week in Review), at 20, col. 1. 
11. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 34-35 (1969). 
12. Id. at 13-16. 
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nonproscribed act criminal. 13 They wanted no personal justice ad­
ministered after the fashion of Caliph Haroun-al-Rashid, but rather 
the administration of known laws with an absolute minimum of dis­
cretion. As Jefferson graphically put it, the Founders sought to 
bind man down with "the chains of the Constitution" because they 
had no confidence in rulers.14 They regarded the Constitution 
with "sacred reverence," in Hamilton's words, because they con­
sidered that it constituted the "bulwark" of their liberties. IS 
This is what John Adams meant by "a government of laws and 
not of men," not, as Levinson would have it, a linkage with "moral 
norms."16 Adams' biographer, Page Smith, confirms that Adams 
meant by that phrase that "men are· secured in their rights to life, 
liberty and property by clear and fair laws, falling equally on all 
... justly administered," differentiating a society where a king be­
stows rights at "whim" as "a society of men, not of laws. "17 When 
one affirms the continuing indispensability of this structure, he 
does not, as Levinson charges, "embrace the rule of law as an an­
swer to the problems of modem governance. "18 No structure of 
government can supply the "answer," it can only furnish a 
framework within which each generation can strive for a peaceable 
solution of clashing aims. Surely this generation need not be re­
minded that uncurbed power, abandonment of the rule of law, re­
turns us to the law of the jungle or, worse, the crematoria of Au­
schwitz and Belsen. It is easy enough for one sheltered by the rule 
of law blithely to dismiss it, but the Indians who lived for a time 
without its protection under Indira Ghandi have recently greeted 
its return with jubilation. 19 
II 
Levinson maintains that most pre-nineteenth century adher­
ents of the rule of law viewed law as being linked with moral 
norms. 20 For this postulate, Levinson relies on Adams and traces 
13. Bill of Rights, Article 24, reprinted in H.S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERlCAN HISTORY 109 (7th ed. 1962). 
14. R. BERGER, supra note 11, at 13 (quoting C. WARREN, CONGRESS 153 
(1935)). 
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 158 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
16. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
17. 1 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 246 (1962). 
18. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
19. Borders, India's Courts Welcome Back 'Rule of Law,' N.Y. Times, June 14, 
1977, § L, at 2, col. 2. 
20. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
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the lineage back to the medieval jurist, Bracton, who linked law to 
God. Law was defined by the medievalist as the "natural reason 
[natural law] given by God," or "as the commands of political lead­
ers ordained by God and therefore given the right to rule. "21 
Adams, however, flatly repudiated monarchical rule by divine 
right. 22 His 1780 Massachusetts Constitution described the body 
politic as "a social compact" whereby the whole people covenant 
with each citizen that "all shall be governed by certain [known] 
laws for the common good," in order that "every man may ... find 
his security in them. "23 So too, natural law, like the "mandate from 
heaven" of Chinese emperors, which was known only to them, col­
lides with Adams' commitment to "clear laws," known to al1. 24 This 
commitment is underscored by his lengthy Bill of Rights in the 
1780 Constitution, which particularizes rights to be protected 
against the goverhment or community. The ban on the quartering 
of soldiers in private homes,25 for example, reflects a practical 
rather than a moral concern. 
It is true that Adams referred to the duty of the state to incul­
cate a common morality. Nevertheless, he wrote, "It is certain ... 
that the only moral foundation ofgovernment is the consent of the 
people. "26 While he was attached to the "moral basis of life, the 
need for religion, "27 Adams maintained that "[g]ood laws and or­
derly government alone would protect 'lives, liberties, religion, 
property, and characters.' "28 He had long been convinced that 
"neither philosophy, nor religion, nor morality ... will ever gov­
ern nations.... Nothing but force in the fonn of soundly drawn 
consitutions and firm laws could restrain men. "29 His were not 
counsels of a heavenly city of moral perfectibility, but a hard­
headed response to man's inherent selfishness. 
Not that Adams' views are for present purposes crucial, for 
Levinson himself notes that Jefferson believed that it "was the will 
of the nation which makes the law obligatory. "30 In this belief Jef­
21. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
22. See 2 P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 692-93. 
23. H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 13, at 107. 
24. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 251-52 (1977). 
25. Bill of Rights, Article 27, reprinted in H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 13, at 
109. 
26. 1 P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 258. 
27. Id. at 274. 
28. 2 P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 690. 
29. Id. at 274. 
30. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 37. 
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ferson was joined by James Wilson, second only to Madison as an 
architect of the Constitution. "[P]opular sovereignty, rooted in will 
rather than in a common moral order," Levinson recognizes, "was 
to become the motif of the new American polity. "31 This view, that 
positive law, expressed in constitutions and laws, represented the 
will of the people, was shared by Adams, Hamilton, Madison, and 
Wilson. 32 It was later reformulated by Justice Holmes and remains, 
as Levinson notes, "the dominant view" of American constitutional 
law. 33 It was a radical shift from Bracton's notions of law, but 
those medieval notions had little or no place in the thinking of the 
Founders, including Adams. 
Those of us who are firmly convinced that Richard Nixon was 
properly forced out of office because of impeachable offenses can­
not concur with Levinson that the "rule of law ... provided an 
ostensibly apolitical rationale for driving from office a scoundrel 
who richly deserved his fate. "34 Such a result-oriented judgment 
would be a reproach to American justice. As one who searched the 
history of the constitutional impeachment provisions before the 
Nixon impeachment rose on the horizon,35 I am convinced that by 
established standards Nixon committed impeachable offenses. 
Levinson intimates that the impeachment leaders were not 
viewed as "subordinate to general conceptions of public morality," 
and cites the contention of the 10 Republican dissenters on the 
House Judiciary Committee that there "was no specific law pro­
hibiting 'abuse of power,''' the offense with which Nixon was 
charged. 36 But "abuse of power" was a classic rubric of "high 
crimes and misdemeanors," and since it therefore had constitu­
tional warrant it needed no statutory sanction. When the Republi­
can dissenters argued that an "abuse of power" could not merely 
be what seems improper "in the subjective view of a temporary 
majority of legislators," a view apparently shared by Levinson, 37 
they equally impugned the time-worn judicial and jury function of 
determining what conduct was "unreasonable" under the circum­
stances. No legal formula, be it "restraint of trade," "negligent 
conduct," or "abuse of power," can do more than pose the particu­
31. Id. 
32. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 252. 
33. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
34. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
35. See Berger, Impeachment for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," 44 S.C.L. 
REV. 395 (1971). 
36. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 38 n. 
37. I d. (emphasis in original). 
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lar case for judgment. Each Congress, like each judge or jury, 
must independently decide whether the facts at bar make out the 
charge. Agreed that the Senate, sitting in judgment, should consult 
the precedents of the past-of which the English, from where the 
terms "high crimes and misdemeanors" were drawn, are more im­
portant than the post-Constitution Senate precedents-and that it 
should not arbitrarily label a trivial act as an "abuse." But the re­
calcitrant Republicans fought tooth and nail to prevent the issue 
from going to the Senate. To cast them in the role of paladins of 
"public morality" is little short of grotesque. 
At bottom Levinson objects to majority rule. "[A]bsolute ac­
quiescence in the decisions of the majority," said Jefferson, is a 
"vital principle of republics. "38 Where would we be after a bitterly 
fought election if the defeated minority took to the streets to reject 
the will of the majority? For the protection of minorities, certain 
rights were placed in the Constitution beyond majority reach. Like 
all human endeavors, this is not a perfect shield. The reconciliation 
of minority and majority interests, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote, 
presents an insoluble problem. 39 Certainly it is not likely to be 
solved by invoking "moral norms." One can say of "moral norms" 
what David Hume said of "natural law": "The word natural is 
commonly taken in so many senses, and is of so loose a significa­
tion, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or 
not. "40 Conceptions of what is "moral" have differed from time to 
time, from country to country. For the Inquisition, morality de­
manded that heretics be burned at the stake; southern ministers 
preached that slavery was divinely ordained. "[S]o much that was 
thought [to be] wisdom," said Bertrand Russell, "turned out to be 
folly. "41 Levinson acknowledges that insistence on a "linkage be­
tween law and moral norms . . . assume[s] a moral consensus 
which no longer exists. . . . "42 Where, then, are we to derive 
moral norms? Few will be prepared to look for them in some 
Platonic absolute about which philosophers will forever dispute. 
Justice Holmes, that most philosophical of jurists, wrote, "[N]oth­
ing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the 
38. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 401 (1947). 
39. Id. at 421. 
40. Quoted in R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDIClAL 
PROCESS 23 (1975). 
41. B. RUSSELL, PORTRAITS FROM MEMORY 197 (1956). 
42. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 99. 
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rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the 
constitution and the laws. "43 
III 
As an offshoot of his "moral norms," Levinson differentiates 
between current "moral pluralism" and the halcyon community 
sharing "a common religious or moral order. "44 In truth that com­
munity was more divided than we are today. Roger Williams did 
not flee Massachusetts because he shared a "common religious or­
der." Whether Quakers and Mennonites of Pennsylvania shared 
that "order" with Catholics of Maryland, or the Scotch-Irish non­
conformists with the Tidewater Episcopal establishment of Virginia, 
may be doubted. 
A "community sharing a common moral vision"45 in terms of 
the federal Constitution, to which Levinson's discussion is directed, 
romanticizes the facts. In 1787 the people viewed a remote, cen­
tralized federal government with suspicion rather than as an ex­
pression of a "common vision." Such distrust was bred in the bone 
of those who had fled from European tyranny and oppression. Sent 
to Congress in Philadelphia from Georgia in 1785, William Hous­
ton "thought of himself as leaving his 'country' to go to a strange 
land among Strangers."46 Madison said, "[O]f the affairs of Georgia 
I know as little as those of Kamskatska. "47 The Southern States 
feared that they would be oppressed by the North; small states 
were fearful of the large; the interests of importing and non­
importing states diverged; there were quarrels over fisheries; a 
state imposed imposts on vessels that came from or went to 
another as if it were a foreign nation. 48 Above all there was a vital 
lack of power to deal with commerce and defense on a national 
scale. It was such worldly considerations, not a "common moral 
vision," which led to the creation of the national "community." 
Early America, in sum, was not "tied together" by shared "moral 
nonns" but rather, as Tocqueville perceived, "by the common pur­
suit of individual interests. "49 
43. O. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171-72 (1920). 
44. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
45. [d. 
46. R. BERGER, supra note 11, at 33. 
47. [d. 
48. See S.E. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 304 
(1965). 
49. S. RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION 47 (1942). 
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In primeval America, Adams, according to Levinson, believed 
individuals were "willing to subordinate their selfish personal 
interest in behalf of a 'common good,''' ready "to recognize pri­
mary obligation to the community," whereas today "most of us cer­
tainly believe that our primary duties are to ourselves and our 
families. Liberty has come to focus on freedom from the commu­
nity or the state rather than the realization of a common vision 
through the community...."50 Preoccupation with the self is 
nothing new. Adams considered that only "force in the form of ... 
constitutions" would restrain the beast. 51 A wise government, said 
Jefferson, would "restrain men from injuring one another" and 
"leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits. "52 Gov­
ernment was instituted, said Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 15, 
"because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of 
reason and justice, without restraint. "53 "What is government it­
self," asked THE FEDERALIST No. 51, "but the greatest of all re­
flections on human nature? If men were angels no government 
would be necessary."54 In short, that "old devil," selfish personal 
interest, was no less present in 1787 than it is today. 
With the passage of 200 years, men have turned to the "com­
munity" in a manner originally undreamed of, for welfare, sub­
sidies, and other contributions. How is this reconcilable with 
"freedom from the community"? At no time has .the majority been 
as ready to help minorities as today; it taxes itself heavily to aid the 
helpless. And what but a "moral vision of the community" can ac­
count for the billions of dollars in food and aid America has sent to 
foreign nations. To make the test of "moral vision" turn on the 
treatment of minorities is to ignore that racial discrimination is a 
stubborn, worldwide phenomenon with which "law" may be in­
adequate to deal. It is no reproach to the Constitution that it has 
not remade man. It could only impose such restraints as he would 
accept and provide a framework in which he could work out his 
own destiny. 
IV 
Levinson denies the existence of "an enduring, timeless Con­
stitution" because its meaning has changed over time, and con­
50. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis original). 
51. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
52. H.C. HOCKE'IT, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1492-1828, at 272 (1931). 
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 92 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
54. [d. at 337. 
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eludes that "A faith whose premises change radically over time is 
scarcely the rock upon which to rely for support. . . . "55 It would 
be more accurate to say that over the years the Supreme Court has 
undertaken to revise the Constitution, to read into it preferences of 
a given majority of the Court, even in flat contradiction of the 
meaning attached to the terms by the Framers. In Levinson's 
words, the Court has"suppl[ied] new meanings. "56 
A quick example of these "new meanings" is furnished by the 
words "due process of law." At the adoption of the Constitution, 
Alexander Hamilton, reflecting historical usage, declared that these 
words "are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the 
courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of the legisla­
ture. "57 The records of the several Conventions and of the First 
Congress which drafted the fifth amendment contain no evidence 
to the contrary, and Hamilton's view was also that of the framers of 
the fourteenth amendment. 58 Notwithstanding, in the 1890s the 
Court transformed due process into an instrument for the over­
throw of socio-economic legislation, thereby substituting its own 
will for that of the people, and giving rise to an "unwritten con­
stitution." No admirer of such judicial "change" has ever pointed to 
the constitutional warrant for this revisory function; instead there is 
solid ground for the conclusion that such authority was withheld 
from the Court. Hamilton branded such judicial action an impeach­
able "usurpation. "59 Here Levinson, however, echoes conventional 
approval of judicial "change." But Justices as diverse as Chief Jus­
tice Burger, Justice Douglas, and Justice Frankfurter are agreed 
that the touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, 
not what the Court has said about it. 6o 
"Can we accept a definition of 'the law,''' asks Levinson, 
"as anything other than that which is declared by the Supreme 
Court . . . ?"61 The Constitution is not an inscrutable mystery which 
yields its secrets only to a black-robed priesthood. Time and again 
the Court has rejected its own earlier constitutional decisions. For 
decades commentators, and eminent jurists, Holmes, Brandeis, 
Stone, Learned Hand, refused to accept the Court's identification 
55. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36, 42. 
56. Id. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 370-72. 
57. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 194 (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 201-06. 
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 526-27 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
60. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 297 n.57. 
61. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
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of its laissez-faire prepossessions with constitutional dogma 
whereby it blocked social and economic reform. Ultimately that 
educational process led the Court to acknowledge error. 62 Unfortu­
nately, similar scholarly criticism of the Court's subsequent iden­
tification of its libertarian predilections with constitutional man­
dates,63 for the most part, has been lacking because the judicial 
course now corresponded with the aspirations of academe and led 
it to mute its criticism. "Scholarly exposure of the Court's abuse of 
its powers," said Justice Frankfurter, would "bring about a shift in 
the Court's viewpoint. "64 Heightened public awareness rather than 
"self-help"-" 'taking the law into our own hands' upon recognizing 
that established officials [Nixon or the Court] are unwilling to fol­
low 'the law' "6S-appears to me a better alternative. Mter the 
"Saturday Night Massacre," an aroused public repudiated Nixon's 
excesses and drove him from the White House. The Court, Profes­
sor Charles Black wrote, would not have "the strength to prevail in 
the face of resolute public repudiation of its legitimacy," or of the 
legitimacy of its decisions. 66 
V 
Levinson glides over the problems presented by judicial 
"change," among them government by judiciary, and draws instead 
on a number of presidential acts to show that the "imperatives of 
the Constitutional system" have not "remained constant since the 
establishment of the Constitutional system in 1789. "67 These, he 
avers, "present problems for anyone seeking an unequivocal 
American tradition against which to measure political leadership 
and define the rule of law. "68 
Levinson begins with "Jefferson's questionable expansion of 
62. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 258 n.39. 
63. In 1945, Chief Justice Stone wrote, "My more conservative brethren in the 
old days [read their preferences] into the Constitution ... [H]istory is repeating 
itself. The Court is now in as much danger of becoming a legislative and Consti­
tution-making body, enacting into law its own predilections, as it was then." A.T. 
MASON, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM: AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
PRACTICE 145-46 (1955). In 1976, Archibald Cox stated that "the Warren Court be­
haved even more like a Council of Wise Men and less like a court than the laissez­
faire Justices." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN­
MENT 50 (1976). 
64. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 415 n.28. 
65. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
66. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 209 (1960). 
67. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 41. 
68. Id. 
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Presidential power in the decision to purchase Louisiana from 
France in 1803. "69 Jefferson laid no claim to "expanded" power. As 
Schlesinger described it, "Congress set up a clamor for Louisiana, 
confirmed the envoys who negotiated the purchase, appropriated 
the funds for the purchase, ratified the treaty consummating the 
purchase and passed statutes authorizing the President to receive 
the purchase ...."70 Even so, Jefferson entertained grave doubts 
concerning the constitutional authority of both Congress and the 
President to annex new territory, but was dissuaded from seeking 
an amendment. 71 Napoleon was an unpredictable expansionist 
neighbor who could block the Mississippi, and Congress and Jeffer­
son acted before the mercurial Bonaparte could change his mind. 
With good reason did Jefferson say, "The legislature ... must ... 
throw themselves on their country for doing for them unau­
thorized, what we know [the people] would have done for them­
selves had they been in a situation to do it. "72 Jefferson did not 
regard this as a "precedent" for unconstitutional executive acts. 
Months after the purchase he wrote, "I had rather ask an enlarge­
ment of power from the nation, where it is found necessary, than 
. to assume it by a construction which would make our powers 
boundless. "73 This was for him the "constant." . 
Next, Levinson refers to Lincoln's "putative disobedience of 
constitutional provisions relating to habeas corpus. "74 Immediately 
after the firing on Fort Sumter, while the Union was crumbling, 
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus to prevent armed se­
cessionists from operating in Maryland. Maryland was swarming 
with them and secessionist control might have isolated Washing­
ton.75 Article I of the Constitution provides that the writ may be 
suspended "when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety 
may require it. "76 It does not say who may suspend, though infer­
ably Congress was to do so because the power appears in the 
69. Id. 
70. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 23 (1973). 
71. Id. at 24; S.E. MORISON, supra note 48, at 366. See also 4 J. ELLIOT, DE­
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 450 n. (2d ed. 1836). 
72. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 70, at 24. 
73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.D. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), reprinted in 
8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247 (P.L. Ford ed. 1897). 
74. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42. 
75. H.C. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1826-1876, at 280-81 (1939); S.E. MORISON, supra note 48, at 612. 
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
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"legislative" article. Lincoln might have invoked the analogy of the 
impeachment of Justices notwithstanding that the provision for im­
peachment of "officers" is contained in the "executive" article. 
Should Lincoln have waited to convene Congress, then not in ses­
sion? Even today one cannot dismiss Lincoln's evaluation of the 
imminent danger. When Congress assembled in July it accepted 
Lincoln's measures willy-nilly. It was in these circumstances that 
Lincoln asked, "Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and 
the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"77 
Lincoln's "suspension" furnishes the only genuine illustration in 
our history for Jefferson's 1810 statement, after he left the presi­
dency, that the laws "of self-preservation, of saving our country 
when in danger, are of a higher obligation" than a "strict obser­
vance of the written laws. "78 
These incidents yield Levinson a queer distillation: "The role 
of the great political leader is often to assume the almost Nietzsc­
hean task of going beyond the law in an effort to transform the 
society which he purports to lead."79 We condone Lincoln's "dubi­
ous" behavior, he continues, because "his memorable vision of 
what this country was truly about, which involved transcending the 
existing constitutional structure and its support for slavery, has 
prevailed.... "80 But this reads subsequent events back into 1861. 
The suspension of habeas corpus was altogether unrelated to slav­
ery; it was designed to protect the capital from a potential enemy. 
Lincoln himself wrote in August, 1862, "My paramount object in 
this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to 
destroy slavery."81 There was no commitment to freeing the slaves 
in the early years of trial; that emerged as the fearful losses 
mounted and as the North came to believe that once and for all the 
cancer' which had eaten away at the vitals of the nation must be 
eradicated. 
Stranger yet is Levinson's question, "Was Nixon's offense his 
disobedience of the law or, rather, his failure [unlike Lincoln] to 
present a plausible case for his violations of law as necessary to 
'national security?' "82 Since the publication of Levinson's article, 
Nixon himself has explained that his "national security" measures 
77. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42. 
78. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 70, at 24-25. 
79. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. 
81. S,E. MORISON, supra note 48, at 616. 
82. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42. 
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were meant to stifle dissenters in order to prevent "those that we 
were negotiating with in Paris" from "gain[ing] the impression that 
they represent a majority." He too assimilated this to Lincoln's ac­
tion for "the purpose of preserving the Constitution and the Na­
tion," though he conceded that "in Lincoln's case it was the sur­
vival of the Union in war time" that was at stake. But he concluded 
that "This nation was torn apart in an ideological way by the war in 
Vietnam, as much as the Civil War tore apart the nation when 
Lincoln was President."83 Vietnam, however, was 6,000 miles 
away, not next door as was Maryland; and habeas corpus was sus­
pended in Maryland to insure defense of the capital, not to gag 
dissent in the North. No President has been subjected to more 
incessant, 'vitriolic calumny during the progress of a war than Lin­
coln, yet he never resorted to wide-scale illegality to counter it. 
Levinson compares the incommensurable. Nixon did not merely 
fail "to present a plausible case"; under the circumstances, it was 
impossible to do so. It would open a frightening chapter in our 
history were dissent stifled to facilitate peace negotiations! 
The great "Nietzschean task of going beyond the law in order 
to transform the society"84 has led to a Hitler. Germany did not 
have to wait for the verdict of posterity for "the final assessment 
. . . whether the bet as to the shape of the future is won or lost;"85 
in the process of realizing Hitler's apocalyptic vision Germany was 
razed ~o the ground. Nothing in the Jefferson and Lincoln incidents 
warrants Levinson's extravagant extrapolation; neither conceived of 
himself as a "superman." A democracy which depends for its salva­
tion on the vision of a "superman" has confessed its impotence and 
is on the road to dictatorship. 
Finally, Levinson remarks, "if law is only that which the 
courts are prepared to enforce ... then it becomes impossible, by 
definition, to accuse those institutions of disobeying the law. "86 
The "enforce" definition was uttered by Holmes in the role of jural 
philosopher, but he did not find it incompatible with his recogni­
tion of "the right of the majority to embody their opinions in 
law,"87 to which he felt bound to give effect despite his disagreement. 
As judge, Justice Holmes stated that when a legislature "has inti­
83. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1977, § A, at 16, col. 1. 
84. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. 
85. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42. 
86. [d. at 99 (emphasis original). 
87. [d. at 38. 
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mated its will . . . that will should be recognized and obeyed. "88 
He condemned uncurbed judicial discretion to alter the law and 
identify personal predilections with constitutional mandates, and he 
recognized the perversion of due process that made such practices 
possible. 89 He accepted the "will" of the people when he could 
ascertain it and refused to change it to correspond to his predilec­
tions. Not every phrase of the Constitution lends itself to such 
analysis; some provisions are amorphous and afford judicial leeway. 
But "due process" and "equal protection," which today furnish the 
bulk of the Court's business, are, as I have elsewhere document­
ed,90 not among them. 
VI 
In a brilliant study, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE, J. W.N. 
Sullivan pointed out that Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy" 
had shaken the doctrine of strict causality in the atomic realm, but 
concluded that for practical purposes men can continue to rely on 
"cause and effect. "91 So too, whatever the philosophical doubts 
about the nature of the rule of law, I consider that society may 
safely continue to rely on it. With Charles McIlwain, I would urge 
that "[t]he two fundamental correlative elements of con­
stitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the 
legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibil­
ity of government to the governed. "92 Without the rule of law 
there is no accountability; recognition that Nixon had violated con­
stitutional limits led to his banishment. It is not merely that re­
spect for law binds our disparate elements together. Men cannot 
live without civil order. Law furnishes protection against the dis­
ruptive forces that would return us to the blood feud, against arbi­
trary power; it assures an accused that he will be impartially tried 
under existing law; and it furnishes a medium for the reconciliation 
of conflicting interests. In a recent monograph, the English Marxist 
historian, E. P. Thompson concluded: 
[Tlhe rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon 
power and the defense of the citizen from power· saIl-intrusive 
88. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). 
89. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissenting opinion). 
90. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 166-220. 
91. J. SULLIVAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 69, 72 (1949). 
92. C. McILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 146 (rev. ed. 
1947). 
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claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To deny 
or belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the re­
sources and pretensions of power continue to enlarge, a desper­
ate error of intellectual abstraction. 93 
93. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 
266 (1975). 
